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Abstract—We present measurements and analysis of censor-
ship on Weibo, a popular microblogging site in China. Since
we were limited in the rate at which we could download posts,
we identified users likely to participate in sensitive topics and
recursively followed their social contacts. We also leveraged new
natural language processing techniques to pick out trending
topics despite the use of neologisms, named entities, and informal
language usage in Chinese social media.
We found that Weibo dynamically adapts to the changing
interests of its users through multiple layers of filtering. The
filtering includes both retroactively searching posts by keyword
or repost links to delete them, and rejecting posts as they are
posted. The trend of sensitive topics is short-lived, suggesting
that the censorship is effective in stopping the “viral” spread
of sensitive issues. We also give evidence that sensitive topics in
Weibo only scarcely propagate beyond a core of sensitive posters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many countries want to have the benefits of the Internet
while also controlling the dissemination of content. There
are many reasons for censoring the Internet, but a major
reason is to prevent civil unrest [1]. Censorship is difficult
to maintain at scale [2]. Social media companies in countries
that tightly control Internet content find themselves in a risky
position. Without lively discussions, they will not have user
engagement and the advertising revenues that come with it.
If discussions turn to sensitive topics, they risk government
intervention that could have negative consequences for the
company. Consequently, many Western social network sites,
such as Twitter or Facebook, are unavailable inside nations
such as China, and homegrown competitors, such as Sina
Weibo, have developed sophisticated censorship systems.
Weibo is the most popular microblogging site in China.
In February 2012, it had over 300 million users [3]. Like
Twitter in other countries, Weibo plays an important role
in the discourse surrounding current events in China. Both
professional reporters and amateurs can provide immediate,
first-hand accounts and opinions of events as they unfold. Even
though a user might normally only see messages from other
users that they directly follow, any message can rapidly “go
viral” by being shared or “retweeted” from one user to the
next. For companies such as Twitter or Facebook, viral posts
impose technical challenges to the scalability and response
time of their service. To Weibo and other such firms, they
create huge censorship challenges as well. Weibo must conduct
its own censorship rather than relying on external mechanisms,
such as China’s “Great Firewall.”
Since the media is heavily controlled in China, some current
events do not appear in traditional media, and are not as
prominent in social media as less sensitive topics are. We
implemented a system which can find these current events and
the related discussions in social media before such content is
removed for censorship reasons. We have developed a user
tracking method for finding sensitive topic posts before they
are deleted. We also apply novel natural language processing
methods. To our knowledge, ours is the first system that can
successfully extract topics from posts that use unknown words
or phrases in Chinese social media. We also document various
proactive and reactive filtering and deletion methods applied
by Weibo, and find that these mechanisms are effective at
restricting discussion of sensitive topics to a core set of posters.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
gives some basic background information about microblogging
and Internet censorship in China. Then Section III describes
the algorithms and methods we used for our measurement and
analysis, followed by Section IV that describes the natural
language processing we applied to the data and presents
results from topical analysis. Section V describes the various
mechanisms that Weibo uses to filter sensitive content. Then,
after discussion in Section VI, we conclude.
II. BACKGROUND
China has invested heavily in a mixture of Internet filtering
technologies [4], [5], [6], [7], cyber police surveillance [8], [9],
[10], and policy [11], [12] in order to tightly control access
to, and the spread of, Internet content.
Starting from 2010, when microblogs debuted in China,
not only have there been many top news stories where the
reporting was driven by social media, but social media has
also been part of the story itself for a number of prominent
events, including the protests of Wukan [13], the Deng Yujiao
incident [14], the Yao Jiaxin murder case [15] and the recent
Shifang protest [16]. There have also been events where social
media has forced the government to address issues directly,
such as the Beijing rainstorms in July.
Sina Weibo (weibo.com, referred to in this paper simply
as “Weibo”) has the most active user community of any
microblog site in China [17]. Weibo provides services which
are similar to Twitter, with @usernames, #hashtags, reposting,
and URL shortening. Posts can also contain 140 UTF-8 char-
acters. Because words in written Chinese often only require
two characters, 140 Chinese characters can have 3-5 times
as much information as 140 characters in English. Two other
major differences are that Weibo allows embedded images and
videos, and users can comment on each others’ posts.
There is relatively little research on Chinese social me-
dia [18], despite the fact that English-speaking social media
scholars perform research on Russian and Persian language
online corpora even though they cannot speak Russian or
Persian (see, e.g., [19]). One of many concerns that can hinder
this work is the general difficulty of mechanically processing
Chinese text. Western speakers (and algorithms) expect words
to be separated by whitespace or punctuation. In written
Chinese, however, there are no such word boundary delimiters.
The word segmentation problem in Chinese is exacerbated
by the existence of unknown words such as named entities
(people, companies, movies, etc.) or neologisms (substituting
characters that appear similar to others, or otherwise coining
new euphemisms or expressions, to defeat keyword-based
censorship) [20]. Furthermore, since social media is heavily
centered around current events, it may well contain new named
entities that will not appear in any static lexicon [21].
Despite these concerns, Weibo censorship has been the
subject of previous research. Bamman et al. [22] performed a
statistical analysis of deleted posts, showing that the presence
of some sensitive terms indicated a higher probability of the
deletion of a post. Their work also showed some geographic
patterns in post deletion, with posts from the provinces of
Tibet and Qinghai exhibiting a higher deletion rate than other
provinces.
WeiboScope [23] was developed at the University of Hong
Kong in order to track trends on Weibo, concurrently with
our own study of Weibo. The core difference between our
work and WeiboScope is that they track a large sample: around
300 thousand users who each have more than 1000 followers,
allowing them to observe usually no more than 100 deletions
per day. We follow a much smaller sample of users, as we will
describe shortly, but we try to focus our attention on users who
are more likely to be censored, enabling us to see many more
censorship events per day.
III. POST DELETION DETECTING SYSTEM
Extracting information from Weibo is not all that different
from the sort of crawling that must be performed by any
search engine. In Weibo each IP address and Application
Programming Interface (API) has a rate limit for access the
service. This forced us to make a number of engineering
compromises, notably focusing our attention where we felt we
could find those posts most likely to be subject to censorship.
A. Identifying the user group
Which users are most likely to be censored? We started
with 25 sensitive users that we discovered manually, leveraging
a list from China Digital Times [24] of sensitive keywords
which are not allowed to be searched on Weibo’s server at
any given time. To find our initial sample of users who post
about sensitive topics, we searched the out-dated keywords
that were later allowed to be searched. From the search results,
we picked 25 users who stood out for posting about sensitive
topics.
Next, we needed to broaden our search to a larger group
of users. We assumed that anybody who has been reposted
more than five times by our sensitive users must be sensitive
as well. We followed them for a period of time and measured
how often their posts were deleted. Any user with more than
5 deleted posts was considered to be sensitive. By expanding
outward in this fashion, after five days of crawling we settled
on a group of over 3,500 sensitive Weibo users, collectively
experiencing more than 3,000 deletions per day (roughly 4%
of the total posts from those users).
While our methodology cannot be considered to yield a
representative sample of Weibo users overall, we believe it is
representative of how users who discuss sensitive topics will
experience Weibo’s censorship. We also believe our sample
is broad enough to also speak to the topics that Weibo is
censoring on any given day.
B. Crawling
Once we settled on our list of users to follow, we wanted to
follow them with sufficient fidelity to see posts as they were
made and measure how long they last prior to being deleted.
We use two APIs provided by Weibo, allowing us to query
individual user timelines as well as the public timeline [25].
Starting in July 2012, we queried each of our 3500 users, once
per minute, for which Weibo returns the most recent 50 posts.
We also queried the public timeline roughly once every four
seconds, for which Weibo returns the most recent 200 posts.
These posts appear to be 2-5 minutes older than real-time. We
believe they represent anywhere from 1.7% to 10% of the full
public timeline (i.e., we seem to obtain more complete traces
at night, when many of Weibo’s users are sleeping and the
posting rate is correspondingly lower).
Weibo appears to enforce rate limits both on individual
users’ queries as well as on source IP addresses, regardless
of what user account is being used for the query. To over-
come these concerns, we used roughly 300 concurrent Tor
circuits [26], driven from our research computing cluster. (We
note, for future researchers who may find Tor blocked, that
network proxies are easy to come by. Amazon’s EC2 and
many other companies sell such services.) Our resulting data
was stored and processed on a four-node cluster using Hadoop
and HBase [27].
C. Detecting deletions
Here today and gone tomorrow: an absent post may have
been censored, or it may have been deleted for any of a variety
of other reasons. User accounts can also be closed, possibly for
censorship purposes. Users cannot delete their own account,
only the system can delete accounts. We conducted a variety of
short empirical tests to see if we could distinguish the different
cases.
When a post is censored, Weibo will no longer show the
post in the public timeline or in a user’s individual timeline.
However, it is still there. Using the identifier for the post the
post can still be queried, resulting in, “permission denied.”
Similar behavior occurs when a user’s account is deleted.
However, when a user directly deletes a post, it appears to be
gone and cannot be fetched again by any API call of which
we are aware. Instead the message is, “Post does not exist.”
Consequently, we can now distinguish between these different
types of deletions.
Our crawler, which fetches each sensitive user’s timeline
iteratively, is looking for missing posts. If a post is in our
database but is not returned from Weibo, then we check to see
if the post is actually still there or, if not, what error message
is returned. Ultimately, with the speed of our crawler, we can
detect a censorship event within a minute of its occurrence.
IV. TOPIC EXTRACTION
Even though we are following a relatively modest number
of Weibo authors, the volume of text we are capturing is still
far too much to process manually. We need automatic methods
to classify the posts that we see, particularly the ones which
are deleted. For this, we will borrow and extend techniques
from the topic extraction literature.
Automatic topic extraction is the process of identifying
important terms in the text that are representative of the
corpus as a whole. Topic extraction was originally proposed
by Luhn [28] in 1958. The basic idea is to assign weights to
terms and sentences based on their frequency and some other
statistical information.
However, when it comes to microblog text, standard lan-
guage processing tools become inapplicable [29], [30]. Mi-
croblogs typically contain short sentences and casual lan-
guage [31]. Unknown words, such as named entities and ne-
ologisms often cause problems with these term-based models.
It can be especially challenging to extract topics from Asian
languages such as Chinese, Korean, and Japanese, which have
no spaces between words. As such, traditional topic extraction
techniques based on lexical overlap (use of the same words)
become difficult to apply.
We applied the Pointillism approach [18] and TF*IDF to
extract hot topics. In the Pointillism model, a corpus is divided
into fixed-length grams; words and phrases are reconstructed
from grams using external information (e.g., temporal correla-
tions in the appearance of grams), giving the context necessary
to manage informal uses of the language such as neologisms.
Salton’s TF*IDF [32], which stands for “term frequency,
inverse document frequency,” assigns weights to the terms of
a document based on the terms’ relative importance to that
document compared to the entire corpus. For example, very
common words such as the word “the” in English are given a
very low weight because the appearance of “the” carries very
little information. We next explain how these techniques work
together.
A. Algorithm
TF*IDF is a common method to discover the importance of
certain words of a document in a corpus. The TF*IDF value
in our case is calculated as:
f(t, dday)× logTotal number of posts for the month
f(t, dmonth)
Here, f(t, d) means the frequency of the term t in document
d. We use trigrams as t, and documents d are sets of tweets
over a certain period of time. dday is the deleted tweets we
caught on day day. Similarly, dmonth is the total deleted tweets
we caught in monthmonth. IDF is the inverse of the document
frequency for deleted posts per month.
First we calculate TF*IDF scores for all trigrams that have
more than 20 occurrences in a day. The top 1000 trigrams with
the highest TF*IDF score will be fed to our trigram connection
algorithm, hereafter “Connector.” To connect trigrams back
into longer phrases, Connector finds two trigrams which have
two overlapping characters. For instance, if there are ABC
and BCD, Connector will connect them to become ABCD.
Sometimes there is more than one choice for connecting
trigrams, e.g., there could also be BCE and BCF. Sometimes
trigrams can even form a loop. To solve these problems, we
first build directed graphs for the trigrams with a high TF*IDF
score. Each node is a trigram, and edges indicate the overlap
information between two trigrams. For example, if ABC and
BCD can be connected to make ABCD, then there is an edge
from ‘ABC’ to ‘BCD’. After all trigrams are selected, we use
DFT (Depth First Traversal) to output the nodes. During the
DFT we check to see if a node has been traversed already.
If so we do not traverse it again. We use the notation ‘...’ to
express previously traversed nodes. After the graphs have been
traversed, we obtain a set of phrases.
For example, the Connector output of the third most popular
topic on 4 August 2012 is:
1.头骨进京鸣冤。河北广平县上坡村76岁的农民冯虎，其子在19
skull go Beijing to redress an injustice. The son of a 76 year
old farmer Fenghu, from Shangpo village, Guangping city, Hebei
province, was ... at 19
2.头骨进京鸣冤。冯出示的头骨赴京鸣...
skull go Beijing to redress an injustice. The skull shown by Feng go
Beijing to redress an injustice...
3.头骨进京鸣冤。冯出示的头骨前额有一大窟窿，他...
skull go Beijing to redress an injustice. There is a big hole on the
skull shown by Feng, he...
4.头骨进京鸣冤。冯出示的头骨前额有一个无罪的公民...
skull go Beijing to redress an injustice. There is a innocent citizen
on the skull shown by Feng, he...
5.头骨进京鸣冤。冯出示的头骨进...
skull go Beijing to redress an injustice. The skull shown by Feng
enter...
6.头骨进京鸣冤。冯出示的头等舱
skull go Beijing to redress an injustice. The first class seat shown by
Feng...
7.【華聯社電】上访15年 老父携儿头骨...
Chinese Community report: petition 15 years, old father bring the
skull of his son...
Outputs 4 and 6 are incorrectly connected. This is because
the same trigrams are shared by different stories that have
high TF*IDF scores on the same day. This problem can be
solved by examining the cosine similarity of the frequency of
occurrence of the first and the last trigram for each result.
Cosine similarity is used to judge whether two trigrams have
correlated trends.
cos.Sim =
< Ai, Bi >��n
i=1Ai
2 ×
��n
i=1Bi
2
where <,> denotes an inner product between two vectors.
For details, please refer to Song et al. [18].
B. Results
From the connected sentences we can begin to understand
the general events that are driving major sensitive topics of
discussion on Weibo. Table I and Table II list the top 5 topics
of the deleted posts from 20 July 2012 to 20 August 2012. (A
computer failure in our cluster prevented us from collecting
data on 6 August 2012.) Note that we just translated the
posts from each topical cluster, we have not confirmed the
veracity of any of the claims of the Weibo users’ posts that
we translated.
Interestingly, besides named entities, we also extracted three
neologisms. They are 李W阳 (Li Wangyang, from 李旺阳),
六圌四 (June Fourth, from 六四), and both 启-东 and 启/东
(Qidong, from 启东).
Next, we estimate how much deleted posts affect a topic’s
propagation by demonstrating the frequency changes by day.
By using the proposed technique from Section IV-A, we
extract the top deleted topics, with a trigram representing that
topic in the sensitive user group.
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Fig. 1. Deletion efficiency in the short term.
Figure 1 shows the trends of the top four censored topics on
4 August 2012. Each sub-graph shows the trigram’s frequency
changes among three different sets of data that we have: the
blue dashed line shows the trigram’s frequency in the user
timeline, the red dotted lines tell us how many times the
trigram were deleted from the user timeline, and the black
solid line shows how many times that trigram appeared in the
public timeline. Note that we do not include reposts in this
graph, since the public timeline does not include any reposts.
The first topic is about a forced abortion accident that
happened three years ago in which both the mother and the
unborn baby died. We see the topic’s frequency was 0 in
both datasets on 2 August 2012 and peaked on 3 August
2012 in the user timeline when it was reported. On 4 August
2012, the number of occurrences of this term in the public
timeline started to increase (from 5 to 7), but as censorship
started, the frequency in the user timeline began to drop, and
it disappeared entirely on 7 August 2012.
Our public timeline has around 17 times more data than our
user timeline dataset, so usually trigrams in the public timeline
will have a larger frequency than in the user timeline. However,
in this example and the three others we see the opposite. This
means that the topic did not spread into the public timeline,
which could be considered successful in terms of achieving a
censors’ goal of preventing the “viral” spread of a particular
topic.
In the other three examples we observed similar results.
Starting from the point where censorship begins, the frequency
of the topic drops dramatically. This prevents users from
discussing the topic with like-minded individuals or getting
feedback, causing them to lose interest and stop posting the
sensitive content. We begin to see how effective Weibo’s
censorship campaigns can be. Despite starting well after a
post has begun to circulate, Weibo can effectively prevent
discussion of sensitive content from going “viral” across its
site.
V. WEIBO CENSORSHIP MECHANISMS
Sina Weibo has a complex variety of censorship mecha-
nisms, including both proactive and retroactive mechanisms.
Proactive mechanisms may include:
• Explicit filtering: Weibo will inform a poster that their
post cannot be released because of sensitive content, with
a message such as, “Sorry, since this content violates
‘Sina Weibo regulation rules’ or related regulation or
policy, this operation can’t be processed. If you need help,
please contact customer service.”
• Implicit filtering: Weibo sometimes suspends posts until
they can be manually checked, with a message such as,
“Your post has been submitted successfully. Currently,
there is a delay caused by server data synchronization.
Please wait for 1 to 2 minutes. Thank you very much.”
• Camouflaged posts:Weibo also makes it appear to a user
that their post was released, but other users are not able
to see the post. The poster receives no warning message
in this case. One example we observed is on 1 August
TABLE I
Blocked Topics - part 1.
Top 1 Top 2 Top 3 Top 4 Top 5
7-20 Syria rebels banner1 Support Syria rebels
7-21 Ji County2 Syria rebels banner1 Liu Futang3 Support Syria rebels
7-22 Beijing rainstorms4 Subway collapse5 Liu Futang3 Guo Jinlong6
7-23 Fanshan Geracomium7 Guo Jinlong6 Beijing rainstorm toll8
7-24 Donate your sister9 Inspect10
7-25 Beijing rainstorm toll8 Guo Jinlong6 Qidong11 Taiwan12
7-27 Red Cross scandal13 Taiwan14 Qidong11 Fangshan15
7-28 Qidong11 Liu Futang3
7-29 Japanese reporter16 Gu Kailai’s case17 Protest in Hong Kong18 Beijing rainstorms4
7-30 Zhou Jun19 Political reforms20 Protest in Hong Kong18 Establishment21 李W阳22
7-31 Yao Wenwei23 Protest in Hong Kong18 Qidong11 Accident63 Complain gov.24
8-1 Complain gov.24 General Liu Yazhou Gu Kailai’s case17
8-2 Freedom of speech25 Red Cross scandal26 General Liu Yazhou Edmund Valtman Demolish old buildings27
8-3 One Child Policy abuse28 Despise CPC29 Cultural Revolution30 Chairman Mao31 Beijing rainstorms4
8-4 One-Child Policy abuse28 Beijing rainstorms32 Human Rights News Wukan33 Protect environment34
8-5 Human Rights News35 Freedom of speech A social phenomena36 Qidong (启-东)37 Gu Kailai’s case17
8-7 Qian Yunhui Accident38 Despise gov. Gov. scandal Gov. scandal Despise gov.
8-8 Qian Yunhui accident38 Gov. scandal39 Beijing rainstorms Group sex40 Liu Futang3
8-9 Group sex40 Li Wangyang41 Gu Kailai’s case17 Liu Futang3 Gov. scandal
1 “Syria proves it’s a proxy war against Russia and China.” The banner says, “Russia and China, whatever you do to protect your puppet
will not stop us from kicking your asses out of Syria.” Picture available at http://twitpic.com/9u9bjz
2 People questioning the Ji County (in Tianjin) fire death toll.
3 An environmentalist who was arrested on July 20th from a hospital. http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4866
4 http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-07-23/giant-beijing-rainstorm-triggers-citizens-anger
5 Rumor about a subway collapse in Beijing.
6 Former mayor of Beijing. Although he resigned as mayor of Beijing, it was said that it was not a resignation in response to
the Beijing rainstorms.
7 A rumor saying that 200 old people were hit by the Beijing rainstorms.
8 Posts calling into question the Beijing rainstorm death toll.
9 Refusal to donate for Beijing rainstorm relief efforts because some people believe that the government did not perform well in
providing disaster relief.
10 Perception that the leaders did not perform well when inspecting the condition of the rainstorm disaster.
11 Protest against waste project. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/28/us-china-environment-protest-idUSBRE86R02Y20120728
12 Taiwanese flag pulled by Olympics organizers after a complaint by Chinese officials.
13 The Red Cross rejected the family of a victim in the Beijing rainstorms trying to get back the body and trying to “rescue”
the body which had been in water for two days. They charged the family for the rescue fee.
14 ROC will be at half-mast to mourn the 77 victims of the Beijing rainstorms.
15 There are news posts with pictures showing the police Commissioners helped to salvage corpses. But net users said they were just
putting on a show.
16 A Japanese reporter was beaten by police when he was interviewing a participant in the Qidong protest.
17 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gu Kailai
18 Protest against National Education in Hong Kong. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qYyJqGfyEDc
19 Net users criticizing the mass media’s impropriety on Zhou Jun’s failure in the Olympic Games.
20 Wen Jiabao’s words about political reforms in a CNN interview.
21 The phrase “Establishment hijack the country.”
22 Neologism for 李旺阳 (Li Wangyang). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death of Li Wangyang
23 A former official was sentenced for inciting subversion of state power because he wrote 52 articles to appeal judicial independence.
24 Complaint about the government for discriminating against farmers.
25 Supreme court judge ordered Weibo to give Ms. Yu 2520 Yan for closing her Weibo account twice.
26 The Red Cross asked for 720 yen to deliver the dead bodies during the Beijing rainstorms, regardless if the person has died or
the family wanted to deliver the body by themselves.
27 An accident caused by demolishing old buildings.
28 A forced abortion accident that happened three years ago which caused both the mother and the unborn baby to die.
29 Mao’s kaiserism.
30 A tragedy that happened in 1970 during the Cultural Revolution.
31 Chairman Mao Memorial Hall is in application for a World Heritage site.
32 Complaints that the government did not update the death toll number caused by the Beijing rainstorms.
33 In the farmers’ representative meeting, Wukan village decided to turn over the wall of the land sold by former officials.
34 Appealing to help Taizhou, it will become Shifang soon. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shifang
35 Li Guizhi, a civil rights activist, was arrested again after escaping from police.
36 College graduates are eager to become officials of the government.
37 A perception that Qidong started to arrest people wildly.
38 New evidence regarding Qian Yunhui’s death. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qian Yunhui
39 Some corruption stories related to the former deputy mayor of Maoming city, Guangdong province.
40 There are a series of indecent photos which contain six people (three female and 3 male) having group sex. Net users tried
to identify these six people and found that they are from Lujiang and some of them are officials.
41 Zhu Zhicheng was arrested, allegedly for not cooperating with the government to hide the reason why Li Wangyang died.
TABLE II
Blocked Topics - part 2.
Top 1 Top 2 Top 3 Top 4 Top 5
8-10 RTL Freedom of speech42 Group sex40 Gu Kailai’s case17
8-11 Group sex40 Gu Kailai’s case17 DHBTC43 Police scandal44 June Fourth (六圌四)45
8-12 Tang Hui46 Group sex40 Kong Qingdong47 RTL59 DHBTC43
8-13 DHBTC43 RTL59 Despise gov.48 Gu Kailai’s case17
8-14 Hongkong49 Scandal of gov.50 Tang Hui51 Zhou Kehua52 DHBTC43
8-15 DHBTC43
8-16 Rumor53 Zhou Kehua52 Diaoyu Island54
8-17 Anti-Japanese55 DHBTC43 North Korea56 Scandal of gov.57 Cultural Revolution58
8-18 Zhou Kehua52 Anti-Japanese62 DHBTC43
8-19 Anti-Japanese62 RTL59 Zhou Kehua52
8-20 Anti-Japanese62 Freedom speech60 Zhou Kehua52 Gu Kailai61
42 Ren Jianyu was sentenced to re-education through labor (RTL) for two years for reposting others’ posts.
43 The bodies and parts currently on display in New York are licensed to the Premier by the Dalian Hoffen Bio Technique Company
Ltd. (DHBTC). DHBTC acquired the bodies indirectly from the Chinese Bureau of Police, which deemed them unclaimed at death.
44 Li Hongna posted a story about herself saying that she was raped by 8 people, including the police inspector.
45 The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, or June Fourth Incident.
46 Tanghui was sentenced to 2 years of RTL for petitioning for the case of her daughter. When her daughter was 11 years old,
she was forced to become a prostitute. http://zh.wikipedia.org/zh/唐慧劳教案
47 Kong Qingdong says: “Taxpayers, to go the hell.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kong Qingdong
48 A work of fiction about government corruption.
49 Hongkong college students did not welcome astronauts visiting from China.
50 Municipal administration beat a passerby who took pictures while they were beating a peddler. After that the municipal
administration said their privacy had been invaded.
51 The daughter of Tanghui has allegedly been raped by government officers.
52 People are suspicious that the killed person is not Zhou Kehua.
53 This is a rumor: Li Ning, a university student, has been made into an exhibition body by Dalian Hoffen Bio Technique Company
Ltd. Li Ning’s mother died suspiciously in the police office. Li Ning petitioned several times in Beijing.
54 Argument about who owns Diaoyu Island, China or Japan.
55 Hongkong people complained the Chinese government are cowards to let the Japanese occupy Diaoyu Island.
56 In response to the rumor that the Chinese government agreed to loan money to North Korea, people saying they do not agree with it.
57 An original government officer, Zhou Wenbin, confessed that he had offered bribes to Yuwei, an officer at the Land Resources
Bureau of Lixin, Anhui province in 2011. Zhou Wenbin started a hunger strike starting from the next day until the personnel
concerning the case are arrested.
58 Fu Dongmei, the daughter of Fu Zuoyi, was treated badly during the Cultural Revolution.
59 Wen Jiabao said that RTL should be prohibited.
60 A user’s account had been blocked, after it was unblocked, he appealed to all the users whose accounts had been blocked to
become a union. He asked several questions: How to protect the freedom of speech?; What kind of organization is the State
Internet Information Office? ; and so on.
61 People do not agree with the suspended death sentence given to Gu Kailai. They called Bo Xilai, Gu Kailai, and family the
biggest mafia in China.
62 Statements that the “Angry Youth” who damaged the Japanese cars on the street are actually traitors.
63 A sinkhole happened in Changan street, Beijing.
2012 for a post containing the substring ‘cgc’ (Cheng
Guangcheng [33]).
• Surveillance: While we have no evidence specific to
Weibo, it is worth pointing out here that surveillance is
often coupled with censorship [10].
When Weibo discovers that posts containing sensitive con-
tent have passed through the filters described above, Weibo
will stop the “viral” propagation of such content. In May
2012, Sina Weibo announced a “user credit” points system [34]
through which users can report sensitive or rumor-based posts
to the administrators. However, while the points system is used
to stymie the spread of rumors through the Weibo community,
removal of sensitive content is still carried out without the
transparency of a points system.
Retroactive mechanisms for removing content that has al-
ready been released may include:
• Backwards reposts search: In our deleted posts dataset
over 82% of reposted posts have a standard deviation of
less than 5 minutes deletion time for the ones repost the
same post, meaning that a sensitive post is detected and
then most of the other posts in a chain of reposts are then
deleted.
• Backwards keyword search: We also observed that
Weibo sometimes removes posts retroactively in a way
that causes spikes in the deletion rate of a particular
keyword within a short amount of time. For example,
there is a neologism兲朝 (Tian Chao, an offensive name
for China, originally from 天朝, or Tian Chao, same
pronunciation as 兲朝, which means Celestial Empire
and is a derogatory term for today’s China because it
implies that it is similar to the feudalistic past. 兲朝
makes the connotation worse, because 兲 contains the
two characters王八，meaning “bastard.”. The frequency
of occurrence of 兲朝 in deleted posts is the sequence
(2,0,1,6,3,0,0,2,2,0,3,0,2,3,3,2,1,2,0,0,1,0,0,0,5,4,4,2,14,3,6,4)
respectively from 25 July 2012 to 25 August 2012.
There is a concentrated deletion (14) of this word on
22 August 2012. We examined each deleted post on
22 August for this keyword and confirmed that these
deletions were not caused by other mechanisms that we
know about.
• Monitoring specific users: For this research, we focused
our monitoring on users who we believed were more
likely to be censored based on their system deletion
history. Does Weibo do the same thing? Figure 2 plots
this effect. We grouped users together who had the same
number of censorship events occur to their posts. The x-
axis is the number of such deletions. The y-axis shows
how long these to-be-censored posts live before they are
deleted for all the users in each cohort. The black circles
show the median lifetime of posts in the cohort, and
the dotted blue bars show plus or minus one standard
deviation from the mean. The clear downward trend
in the medians can be interpreted in two ways. Either
Weibo pays more attention to users once they have been
censored, or users who are more profligate with sensitive
posts are less inclined to try to work around Weibo’s
censorship.
• Account closures: Weibo also closes users’ accounts.
There were over 300 user accounts closed by the system
from our sensitive user group (out of over 3,500 users).
• Search filtering: To prevent users from finding sen-
sitive information on weibo.com, Weibo also has a
frequently updated list of words [24] which cannot be
searched.
• Public timeline filtering:We believe that sensitive topics
are filtered out of the public timeline. We do not believe
that this affects our results from Section IV where we
compared the user timeline to the public timeline; how-
ever, because the filtering appears to be limited to only
general topics that have been known to be sensitive for a
relative long time.
VI. DISCUSSION
Our results demonstrate that if the goal of censorship is to
stop sensitive topics from being discussed for a long period
of time and prevent the discussion from spreading throughout
the system, then Weibo’s censorship mechanisms are effective.
Our topical analysis shows that topics usually last just two or
three days at the most, and we further showed that topics
do not spread from the user timeline (i.e., the users who
regularly discuss sensitive topics) to the public timeline (i.e.,
the majority of users).
An analogy can be drawn with the human immune system.
Because users can use neologisms to circumvent proactive
filtering of sensitive keywords, Weibo must adapt in much the
same way that our body adapts to ever-changing viral threats.
Our immune system combines proactive defenses with reactive
defenses, and is distributed with multiple layers. Weibo has
several layers of filtering with graduated responses, and the
ability to retroactively delete posts based on repost linkages
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Fig. 2. Users’ median post lifetime in minutes vs. the number of deletions
for that user on a log-log scale.
and keywords. The detection and removal of sensitive content
is also a distributed process. Furthermore, users who often post
sensitive content seldom have their accounts removed. They
may be an important part of the adaptive immunity process.
As Eaves [35] mentioned, Weibo may control the direction of
the flow of posts and topics, rather than shutting down the
flow.
A biological immune system’s focus is not on reaching
zero infection as quickly as possible, but rather on stopping
infections from spreading and interfering with the health of
the organism. Weibo’s censorship seems to have a similarly
pragmatic focus. As long as sensitive topics are not going
“viral,” a few sensitive posts can be tolerated for some period
of time.
Our research detected that deletions happen most heavily
in the first hour after a post has been made. Especially for
original posts that are not reposts, most deletions occur within
5-30 minutes, accounting for 25% of the total deletions of
such posts. Nearly 90% of the deletions of such posts happen
within the first 24 hours of the post.
One aspect of censorship that is not considered in our
analysis, but would be an interesting topic for future work, is
the interactions between social media and traditional media.
Leskovec et al. [36] gives an interesting analysis of the
interplay between blogs and traditional media during the 2008
U.S. Presidential election. Traditional media relevant to Weibo
may include the state-run media that is heavily censored,
or off-shore news outlets that are uncensored but limited in
availability and sometimes offset from China’s news cycles
by timezone differences.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that Weibo’s internal censorship is effective
at limiting the amount of time that a sensitive topic is dis-
cussed, and at preventing the discussion from spreading from
a core set of users who discuss sensitive topics to the general
Weibo community. This is accomplished through a combi-
nation of proactive and reactive mechanisms. The apparent
effectiveness of Weibo’s censorship creates difficult technical
challenges for building anti-censorship systems. Likewise,
other social networking systems may be compelled by other
countries to follow Weibo’s example, creating public policy
challenges for free speech advocates.
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